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Abstract 
As we are living in the digital age, information technology appears in nearly 
every aspect of our daily lives, and plays an integral role in agriculture, industry, 
education, business, politics, etc. Thanks to its undeniable convenience, 
information technology has helped to make our lives easier and more comfortable. 
For instance, VoIP (voice over IP) provides a cheaper and sm0other experience 
for intercontinental voice communications. Moreover, Internet advancement 
continues to provide easier ways to store, share, retrieve, and access an infinite 
amount of information online. However, despite the many ways that information 
technology helps to enrich our lives, it functions as a double-edged sword, with 
the potential to become a trap for users with a limited understanding of 
technological complexities. 
Along with the rapid expansion of the Internet and various forms of 
information technology in recent years, the issues of censorship and surveillance 
in cyberspace have become more prevalent. Many governments around the world 
are making use of information technology to extensively monitor and censor the 
Internet. Even in areas with a long history of freedom of speech, like North 
America and Western European countries, surveillance of Internet user activity 
occurs on a daily basis. Since most Internet users are unaware of the extent to 
which they are being monitored online, they are susceptible to having their 
privacy compromised by such unconstitutional surveillance activities. Through 
this study, the author would like make Internet users more aware of the issues 
surrounding online privacy. In addition, several privacy-enhancing technologies 
will be introduced, along with their advantages and disadvantages, to educate 
Internet users about the tools that can be used to help protect their privacy in 
cyberspace. 
Among the available pro-privacy tools, Tor (The Onion Router) is the most 
popular and will be the focus of this study. By carefully investigating its operating 
mechanism and remaining weaknesses, the author shows that Tor is not as safe 
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as many Internet users believe. Tor cannot guarantee complete anonymity while 
surfing the Internet. By using a real-life example, the author shows that there are 
cases in which Tor is ineffective for this purpose. Tor remains vulnerable to a type 
of attack known as a correlation attack, which can be carried out by entities that 
have the ability to observe a large portion of Internet traffic, especially the 
autonomous system (hereafter: AS).  
Regardless of the many AS-aware Tor clients proposed in studies over the last 
decade to help users mitigate the threat of AS-level adversaries, none of these 
clients have been widely adopted by end users. 
After carefully considering the scalability problem in Tor and exhaustively 
evaluating related works on AS-level adversaries, the author proposes ASmoniTor, 
which is an autonomous system monitor for mitigating correlation attacks in the 
Tor network. In contrast to prior works, which often released offline packets, 
including the source code of a modified Tor client and a snapshot of the Internet 
topology, ASmoniTor is an online system that assists end users with mitigating 
the threat of AS-level adversaries in a near real-time fashion. For Tor clients 
proposed in previous works, users need to compile the source code on their 
machine and continually update the snapshot of the Internet topology in order to 
obtain accurate AS-path inferences. On the contrary, ASmoniTor is an online 
platform that can be utilized easily by not only technical users, but also by users 
without a technical background, because they only need to access it via Tor and 
input two parameters to execute an AS-aware path selection algorithm. 
With ASmoniTor, the author makes three key technical contributions to the 
research against AS-level adversaries in the Tor network. First, ASmoniTor does 
not require the users to initiate complicated source code compilations. Second, it 
helps to reduce errors in AS-path inferences by letting users input a set of 
suspected ASes obtained directly from their own traceroute measurements. Third, 
the Internet topology database at the back-end of ASmoniTor is periodically 
updated to assure near real-time AS-path inferences between Tor exit nodes and 
the most likely visited websites. Finally, in addition to its convenience, 
ASmoniTor gives users full control over the information they want to input, thus 
preserving their privacy. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
First of all, this chapter aims to provide an overview of privacy, Internet privacy 
and privacy-enhancing technologies. As a major focus of this study, The Onion 
Router (Tor) is then introduced and discussed comprehensively, including its 
design, operating mechanism, and drawbacks. Finally, the primary motivation of 
this study and the overall structure of the thesis are described at the end of the 
chapter. 
1.1 Privacy 
1.1.1 Background 
Humans have been developing strategies to protect confidential information 
for many years, even prior to the digital age. The use of codes and ciphers is a 
common example [1]. Confidential information, also known as private or secret 
information, can belong to a single person or a group of people. This information 
can be anything, ranging from biological information or healthcare information, 
to financial transactions or geographic location data.  
However, due to differences among cultures and individuals, there is no 
concrete definition of confidentiality, privacy or secrecy. For instance, 
biographical, location and gender data for closeted GLBT people is sensitive 
information. On the other hand, this information may serve as valuable tool for 
GLBT activists trying to raise public awareness of the GLBT community. As a 
result, the idea of adequate privacy preservation is something that is highly 
variable from person to person [2]. 
Despite the extensive variability in definitions of privacy, there is some 
commonality that exists: sensitivity and importance of the information to its 
owner. Because the leak of such information may have a negative impact on the 
owner, the right to privacy is rigorously protected by all of the Western European 
countries in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights [3], and is 
clearly declared by the United Nations in Article 12 of The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights [4]. 
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1.1.2 Privacy on the Internet 
Since the invention of electronic computers, humans have witnessed the rapid 
development of the Internet, which is a continuously expanding network of 
interconnected computers and other electronic devices around the globe. The 
evolution of the Internet has significantly changed the way by which people 
exchange information and communicate with one other. In that context, the 
ability of an Internet user to preserve her privacy depends on what information 
she wants to reveal or conceal while using the Internet. However, privacy on the 
Internet, although globally discussed and articulated in law, is not completely 
preserved. The nature of the Internet and the advancement of technology have 
made it easy to collect private information [5]. In most cases, Internet users 
(especially non-technical users) do not know how to control and are unaware of 
the potential for extensive collection of personal information by third parties 
without the user’s consent.  
Privacy on the Internet can either encompass personally identifiable 
information (such as biographical information, an IP address of a connecting 
device, and so on) or non-personally identifiable information (such as mouse 
clicks, or web surfing behaviors). The combination of such information, although 
not complete, is often unique enough to identify a specific person. For clarity, the 
following terms are often introduced when discussing privacy on the Internet: 
untraceable, unobservable, anonymous. 
 Untraceable is when a piece of information cannot be used to trace other 
information of the Internet user. For instance, an attacker can track down the 
location of a victim using an IP address alone. Therefore, by hiding the real IP 
address, the Internet user can reduce this risk to a certain extent, depending on 
which pro-privacy technology is used. 
 Unobservable is when the Internet user cannot be observed. For example, 
Internet service providers (hereafter: ISP) cannot monitor the content of the data 
packets sent over their network if the Internet user encrypts the connection by 
means of cryptography.  
 Anonymous is when the Internet user does not leave any clue of 
personally identifiable information while online. 
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1.1.3 Privacy-enhancing technologies 
Due to the increasing concern about privacy in the digital age, many privacy- 
enhancing technologies (hereafter: PET) have been invented to support the 
Internet user. PET is a suite of computer applications and algorithms that, when 
combined with other online services or applications, protects the privacy of 
Internet users. In other words, PET can be defined as “a system of ICT measures 
protecting informational privacy by eliminating or minimising personal data 
thereby preventing unnecessary or unwanted processing of personal data, 
without the loss of the functionality of the information system. [6]” 
Although there are many technologies that can be employed to effectively 
protect one’s privacy, the scope of this study is limited to online privacy and 
anonymity, thus only those techniques that are widely used by Internet users are 
discussed. These techniques include the private browsing function integrated into 
most Internet browsers, proxies, virtual private networks (VPN), and The Onion 
Router (Tor). 
 Private browsing mode of Internet browsers 
Most Internet browsers have implemented a built-in private browsing mode to 
protect user privacy. This mode is also known as “Incognito mode” in Chrome, 
“Private Browsing mode” in Firefox, and “InPrivate mode” in Microsoft Edge. The 
advantage of this browsing mode is that it deletes all cookies and browsing history 
when the user closes the browser. However, like normal browsing mode, it does 
not help to protect the Internet user from being monitored by man-in-the-middle 
attacks, or from the collection of their private information by accessing the 
destination server. 
 Proxy servers 
A proxy server prevents the destination server from logging the real IP address 
and other related information about the device being used by the Internet user. 
However, transmitted data packets still have to go through the physical network 
of the ISP before being sent to the proxy server, thus it is still vulnerable to the 
man-in-the-middle attack. In other words, anyone who can monitor the traffic 
between the user and the proxy can still capture the transmitted data packets and 
analyze them to uncover private information about the user. 
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 Virtual private network (VPN) 
VPN was introduced to solve the key problem of proxy servers mentioned above. 
Unlike proxy servers, it encrypts all of the packets sent from the user to the VPN 
server. The VPN server, on behalf of the user, connects to the intended destination. 
The advantage of VPN is that once it is enabled, all traffic will be encrypted, 
regardless of the type of application being used. As a result, the ISP or the man-
in-the-middle cannot uncover private information from captured data packets. 
Nonetheless, VPN cannot guarantee the Internet user’s privacy. There have been 
several cases in which VPN providers have made businesses out of users’ private 
information, or have made the logged data available to law enforcement upon 
request. 
 The Onion Router 
Tor was created to mitigate the drawbacks of the aforementioned pro-privacy 
technologies. It employs asymmetric cryptography and creates multiple layers of 
encryption. When transmitting packets between the user and a final destination 
host, a random path consisting of three nodes is used so that each node only 
knows a part of the whole transmission process, guaranteeing the anonymity of 
the user. Tor has been proved to be the most robust pro-privacy tool in previous 
work [5]. Since it is the dominant topic throughout this study, details of its design 
and operating mechanism will be discussed comprehensively in Section 1.2.  
Table 1 summarizes the pros and cons of each technology, as studied in 
previous work [5]. 
Table 1: A comparison of pro-privacy technologies 
Testing tool Private Browsing mode Proxy VPN Tor 
Against IP logging Fail Pass Pass Pass 
Against man-in-the-
middle attack 
Fail Fail Pass Pass 
Against trace-back Fail Fail Fail Pass 
Support of dynamic IP 
and change of 
transmission path 
No No Limited Yes 
Cost Free Flexible Flexible Free 
Pro-privacy level 
Low   High 
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1.2 Tor: The Onion Router 
1.2.1 Design goals 
Nowadays, it is widely known that government surveillance activities are 
happening a daily basis [7], [8], even in regions with a long history of freedom of 
speech like Western countries. According to the Guardian, the NSA has a program 
called Marina that can track and store the online metadata of millions of Internet 
users for up to one year [9]. It does not only take place in the United States, but 
also in other countries like Japan [10]. At the same time, Britain’s GCHQ has 
secretly gained access to the networks of cables that transmit the world’s phone 
calls and Internet traffic [11]. 
Because of this widespread surveillance activity, anonymous communication 
has drawn remarkable attention from both researchers and ordinary Internet 
users, and it grows to support an increasing number of users, with various 
applications, who want to protect their privacy while online [12]. 
As discussed in subsection 1.1.3, despite the existence of many pro-privacy and 
anti-censorship applications that are freely available on the Internet to protect the 
Internet user’s privacy and anonymity (proxy servers, VPN, etc.), Tor has proved 
to be the most robust tool among them. It helps Internet users prevent those 
entities with the ability to monitor Internet connections from discovering what 
sites are being visited, and it also prevents the visited sites from knowing the real 
IP address of Internet users. For instance, people in China may use Tor (with the 
help of Tor’s Bridge nodes, since the direct access to Tor is also blocked in China) 
to access websites that are censored by the Great Firewall of China, such as BBC 
news, Facebook and YouTube, while journalists and activists use Tor to protect 
themselves from the surveillance of repressive regimes. 
1.2.2 Operating mechanism 
The Tor network has two main elements: a group of nine directory authorities 
and a network of approximately 7000 relays [13]. The directory authorities are 
centralized, trusted servers that keep track of the whole Tor network. The relays 
(aka routers or nodes) are voluntary computers, distributed around the world, 
and can be categorized into bridge, guard, middle and exit relays based on their 
functionality and position in the virtual circuit. 
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As shown in Figure 1, the Tor user software (a Tor client which can be a Tor 
Browser Bundle [14], Tails [15], or any interface that talks to the Tor network) 
initially fetches a consensus “network status” document containing all Tor relays’ 
information from hard-coded directory authorities. Before being sent to the 
intended destination host, data packets are encrypted multiple times using 
public-key cryptography. These packets are then forwarded through a virtual 
circuit, made up of several relays, using Onion Routing Protocol [16]–[19]. 
(Ideally three relays for direct users and more in the case of bridge users [20]). 
 
Figure 1: System Architecture of the Tor network 
As illustrated in Figure 2, at each relay, one encryption layer of the packet is 
decrypted to reveal the next relay’s IP address until the packet reaches the final 
destination. Later, response packets are sent in a reverse fashion back to the client. 
The whole mechanism is similar to peeling away the layers of an onion, where 
each relay only knows the previous and the next relays. By this mechanism, 
without traffic analysis, none of the relays in the virtual circuit can correlate the 
original sender and the destination. Thus, the privacy of the client is guaranteed. 
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Figure 2: Packet transmission in the Tor network 
In recent versions, in order to improve both performance and overall traffic 
balance in the Tor network, each client selects relays in proportion to their 
bandwidth to form the virtual circuit. For instance, given a total number N of 
routers in the network and the bandwidth bi provided by router b, the probability 
that router b will be chosen is calculated as follows: 
𝑏𝑖
∑ 𝑏𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=1
 
In addition, for security purposes, Tor client does not choose the same router 
twice for the same transmission circuit. Similarly, relays in the same /16 subnet 
(aka Class B network) are not selected to be in the same circuit. For instance, Tor 
client will choose only one relay from the IP range XXX.XXX.0.0 to 
XXX.XXX.255.255 if there is more than one relay in the IP range. Finally, relays 
in the same family are not selected to be in the same circuit. Two relays are in the 
same family if each one lists the other in the family entries of its descriptor [21]. 
1.2.3 Weaknesses 
Despite its popularity, Tor has some drawbacks that have been identified. 
These drawbacks can be clustered into two groups: scalability and security. In 
contrast to previous works that addressed these problems in a theoretical manner, 
this study investigates the problem of scalability based on real-life data so that 
readers can gain a more comprehensive understanding of the remaining 
scalability problem in current Tor design. In addition, a set of well-known and 
severe attacks against Tor will be revisited briefly in this section. 
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Scalability 
In order for Tor to function properly, all Tor clients try to continually maintain 
a live consensus network status document containing information about all relays 
that is necessary for the client to build anonymous circuits. As defined in Tor 
directory protocol, a network status document is “live” if the time in its “valid-
until” field has not passed [22]. At the time of writing this thesis, Tor directory 
authorities publish a new consensus network status document every hour, and 
that consensus is valid for three hours after its release. As a result, all Tor clients 
try to update to a new consensus network status document every few hours (less 
than 3 hours) to ensure their information about all available relays is current. 
Nevertheless, McLachlan et al. [23] had foreseen that the Tor network would 
be spending more bandwidth on serving the consensus network status document 
because of the dramatic increase in the number of both relays and clients. In more 
detail, given n clients and r relays in the Tor network, the bandwidth cost for 
distributing the consensus network status document to all clients in recent Tor 
design is estimated by 𝑂(𝑛𝑟) , while the bandwidth available for the whole 
network only increases by 𝑂(𝑟). 
For a more comprehensive insight into how the number of clients and relays 
impact the bandwidth overhead for serving the consensus network status 
document, past data of direct users and relays were retrieved from Tor Metrics 
[24] and plotted in Figure 3 and Figure 4. 
 
Figure 3: Daily direct users (in million) 
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Figure 4: Relays in the Tor network over time 
As shown in Figures 3 and 4, the number of users has doubled, while the 
number of relays has nearly tripled in the last 5 years. As highlighted by the green 
node in Figure 3, starting around mid-August 2013, Tor was under a coordinate 
attack by a bot twice the size of the regular Tor network. This attack is the reason 
there were about 6 million daily users at that moment [25]. Tor was still usable at 
that time but could not avoid wasting a huge amount of bandwidth 
(approximately 18 TB/day was the peak of the attack, as highlighted by the green 
node in Figure 5) on answering the directory requests (aka request to download 
the consensus network status document), and some relays were saturated by the 
huge number of connections and circuits that they had to handle. 
 
Figure 5: Bandwidth spent on serving directory requests (in TB/day) 
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In addition, during December 2014, there was a Sybil attack [26] on Tor in 
which a large number of small exit relays were created. It was detected 
immediately [27], but still caused an increase in the size of the consensus network 
status document, as highlighted by the red nodes in Figures 4, 5 and 6. 
 
Figure 6: Size of the consensus network status document (in KB) 
Figures 5 and 6 show the sensitivity of the cost of bandwidth for serving the 
consensus network status, particularly to changes in the number of clients and 
relays in the Tor network. The data for Figure 5 and Figure 6 are not readily 
available; therefore, we first fetched the raw data of number of bytes spent on 
answering directory requests from Tor Metrics [28] and past data of consensus 
files from Tor Collector [29]. Then, some calculations and parsing procedures 
were conducted to retrieve necessary values for plotting the graphs. The size of 
consensus file in Figure 6 is the average size of consensus files collected per day. 
By observing Figures 3 through 6, there are some obvious correlations in the 
increasing pattern between Figures 3 and 5, and between Figures 4 and 6, while 
Figures 4 and 5 have a similar pattern during the period from March 2014 until 
June 2016. As a result, we can preliminarily conclude that both number of clients 
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and relays have significant effect on bandwidth cost for serving the consensus 
network status document. However, the number of clients has a more obvious 
effect on the bandwidth cost compared to other factors. To that end, there are four 
possible combinations of changes that could happen to the number of clients and 
relays in the future. The likely impact of these changes on bandwidth cost is shown 
in Table 2. 
Table 2: Possible changing patterns of bandwidth cost for serving the consensus 
network-document in the Tor network 
 
Number 
of clients 
Number 
of relays 
Bandwidth cost for serving the consensus 
network-document 
1 decrease decrease will decrease 
2 decrease increase decrease will more likely happen than increase 
3 increase decrease increase will more likely happen than decrease 
4 increase increase will dramatically increase 
The number of Tor clients is predicted to continue increasing in the coming 
years due to deep concerns about censorship and surveillance activities in 
cyberspace [30]. As a result, the two highlighted patterns in Table 2 are more 
likely to happen. Hence, future works need to take the scalability into careful 
consideration and restrain from unnecessarily increasing the size of the 
consensus network status document or requiring clients to download more 
consensus documents. Because most of Tor’s relays are voluntarily operated [31], 
or run by limited sources of donation [32], bandwidth must be saved and used in 
an economical fashion. Therefore, all of the proposals in this study will be 
discussed and suggested in a careful manner, such that they will not cause 
additional scalability problems to the entire Tor network. 
In addition to the above findings, dividing data in figure 6 by the data in figure 
4 and taking the average value gives a better representation of the size of the 
consensus document. With recent Tor design, the result shows that every new 
relay joining Tor would increase the size of the consensus network status 
document by approximately 210~230 bytes, regardless of its bandwidth resource. 
Although discussing the contribution of fast/slow relays to the overall Tor 
network is beyond the scope of this study, it is vital to argue that relays with higher 
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bandwidth would be preferable to the slow ones. Because of the recent Tor’s relay 
selection algorithm, very little traffic will be directed to a slow relay, while the 
whole network still needs to maintain and distribute information for that 
particular relay (e.g., bandwidth cost for periodically scanning the relay’s 
bandwidth, computational cost for voting the relay among directory authorities 
and bandwidth cost for distributing the relay’s information to the entire Tor 
network). It should also be noted that the importance of those slow relays is 
undeniable in the Tor network because anonymity is the direct result of diversity 
in the number of relays, users and so on. Therefore, to improve the 
aforementioned circumstance, Tor developers suggest that a relay should have a 
minimum bandwidth of 250 KB for both download and upload links [33]. 
Low Latency Attack 
This type of attack is also known as a traffic analysis attack, or a congestion 
attack. With only a partial observation of the Tor network, Murdoch and Danezis 
in [34] were able to make use of traffic analysis techniques to predict which Tor 
nodes were being used to relay an anonymous stream, thus allowing them to 
compromise the identity of the client. The attack is based on the fact that Tor 
maintains a bin for each anonymous stream and relays them in a round-robin 
fashion. As a result, the latency (i.e., the gap of time between bin accesses) is a 
function of the number of bins. Thus, adding an anonymous stream to a given Tor 
node affects the latency of all other stream being transmitted via that node. The 
adversary in this attack can be a bad destination host that wants to reveal the 
identity of its clients. When a client connects to that host via Tor, the host tries to 
respond the client’s request with manipulated packets that makes the traffic have 
a very specific pattern. By this method, the adversary can learn the nodes on the 
Tor path by probing the suspected routers using another Tor client. The attack 
was first reported in 2005, when there were only 50 nodes in the Tor network. 
However, the increasing number of Tor clients and relays in its network has made 
the original congestion attack infeasible, thus it is no longer employed to attack in 
today’s Tor network. In 2009, Evans et al. in [35] proposed an enhanced version 
of the original low-latency attack by injecting JavaScript code into the client’s 
request. As a consequence, those clients whose Tor browser has JavaScript still 
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enabled will be detected by the specific traffic pattern manipulated by malicious 
JavaScript. The main purpose of the attack is to identify the guard node of the 
client, thus compromising her identity. 
Path Selection Attack 
As mentioned in section 1.2.2, in order to provide a low-latency service, and 
also to improve the overall traffic balance in the Tor network, Tor path selection 
algorithm is done in proportion to the bandwidth of the relay to form the virtual 
circuit (aka anonymous path). 
However, Øverlier and Syverson found that original Tor path selection 
algorithm was vulnerable to manipulation [36]. Since the original Tor lets the 
relays self-report their bandwidth, the adversary can create a set of low-resource 
relays and maliciously advertises high-bandwidth capacities, thus increasing the 
probability that his malicious relays will be selected by Tor client. In a worse case, 
if many relays under the control of the adversary are selected, a circuit-linking 
algorithm or a timing attack can be deployed to compromise the identity of the 
client. In [37], the authors show that with the control of only 6 out of 66 relays 
run in a PlanetLab-based [38] Tor experiment, they could compromise 46% of 
anonymous paths. 
To remedy the problem, Tor has been deploying bandwidth authorities to 
measure the bandwidth of all of the relays in the Tor network since 2009. 
Passive Attack 
Fingerprinting attacks and AS-level attacks are two types of passive attacks. 
A fingerprinting attack [39]–[41] is a type of attack in which the adversary only 
needs to monitor the traffic between the client and the guard relay. The success of 
this attack is heavily based on machine learning techniques (e.g., classifying, 
clustering, etc.) To carry out the attack, the adversary first studies the traffic 
pattern of a set of websites of his interest, using supervised machine learning 
techniques in order to create a classifier. The adversary then observes the traffic 
between the client and the guard node, letting the classifier predict whether or not 
the Tor client is browsing one of the websites of the attacker’s interest. Some 
previous works suggested adding noise to the traffic to alleviate this type of attack 
[42]–[47]. 
  14 
An AS-level attack is also known as a correlation attack. This type of attack is 
when an adversary can monitor both ends of a Tor path. In other words, the 
adversary needs to observe the traffic between the client and the guard relay, as 
well as the traffic between the exit relay and the intended destination host. By 
analyzing the time, size and frequency of packets passing through the two ends, 
the adversary will be able to correlate the client and her accessing destination host, 
thus deanonymizing the Tor user. Although many studies and proposals [48]–
[55] have been done to weaken this attack, it still remains a lingering problem of 
Tor due to the nature of the Internet including centrality, routing policy, and the 
general lack of awareness among non-technical Tor users. Since the scope of this 
thesis mainly focuses on how to efficiently and effectively mitigate the threat of 
AS-level adversaries, Chapter 2 is dedicated to a comprehensive discussion of 
previous related works in the domain of AS-level attacks against Tor. 
1.3 Contributions of this study 
Three specific contributions of this study include the following: 
 Based on historical data of the Tor Network, we are able to measure the 
increasing size of the consensus file caused by a new relay (if added) to 
the Tor network, which varies from 210 KB to 230 KB.  
 We examine the feasibility of the Shorter-Tor-path approach to 
neutralize the risk of the AS-level attack. 
 Finally, we are working toward realizing a system called ASmoniTor to 
assist the Tor user in mitigating the threat of being deanonymized by 
AS-level adversaries. 
1.4 Thesis organization 
The thesis is organized in 6 chapters. The First two chapters are dedicated to 
general introductions to online privacy, The Onion Router and related works. 
Chapter 3 revisits the scalability problem in Tor and preliminarily introduces a 
proposal to mitigate AS-level adversaries. Chapter 4 examines the feasibility of 
the shorter-Tor-path approach. In Chapter 5, we introduce ASmoniTor, which is 
an online system to assist Tor users in combatting AS-level correlation attacks. 
The conclusion of this thesis and future works are summarized in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2 Related Work 
Tor is different from high-latency anonymity techniques, such as Mixminion 
[56], which add some delay into packets to combat very powerful adversaries who 
are able to monitor a large portion of Internet traffic. In contrast, Tor provides a 
low-latency anonymity service for real-time interactive applications, such as web 
surfing. As an inevitable consequence, adversaries with the ability to monitor 
traffic at the two ends of a Tor communication (i.e., the route between the client 
and the guard relay, and the route between the exit relay and the final destination) 
can deploy traffic analysis techniques to correlate the size and transmitted time 
of data packets in order to deanonymize the user. This chapter is dedicated to a 
discussion of related studies on this lingering problem. 
2.1 Nick Feamster and Roger Dingledine [48] 
As one of the first studies conducted to empirically analyze the threat of AS-
level adversaries in the Tor network, this study proposed a metric called Location 
Independence to measure the probability that the incoming and outgoing 
connections (i.e., the connection between the client and the guard node, and the 
connection between the exit node and the intended destination host) could have 
passed a common AS. The authors found that a single AS could observe both 
connections 10%~30% of the time. 
However, at the time of conducting the study, there were only 33 relays in the 
Tor network. In addition, the authors carried out the experiment based on 
personal opinions about the websites that Tor users often visited, and only took 
into account the Tor clients located in the United States. 
2.2 Matthew Edman and Paul Syverson [49] 
Five years after the work of Feamster and Dingledine [48], at a time that when 
the Tor network had grown to have around 2000 relays and 250000 users, the 
problem of AS-level adversaries was revisited. In spite of the growth, the authors 
in [49] showed that the threat of a single AS monitoring traffic between the two 
ends of anonymous Tor paths was greater than it was in previous work, with the 
ability to observe 39.4% of all randomly generated anonymous paths. 
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However, one of the drawbacks of the study is that the authors measured the 
AS threat based heavily on an AS path inference technique [57], which often 
generates paths different from the real-time traceroute result and does not 
accurately reflect the threat of AS-level adversaries. The difference between paths 
collected by real-time traceroute measurements and by inference is alleged to be 
80% in a current study [53], thus necessitating a more reliable method. 
Furthermore, in order to obtain samples of the clients’ ASes and the likely 
visited websites’ ASes, the author created two Tor nodes (one guard and one exit) 
to collect traffic information. However, this method is no longer reliable to 
measure the risk of AS-level adversaries in the current Tor network because the 
network has expanded to more than 2000 guard nodes and 800 exit nodes, as we 
will discuss in subsection 4.2.2. In addition, the issue of ethics has to be carefully 
considered when collecting statistical data in the live Tor network [58]. In other 
words, measuring sensitive data can be harmful to the anonymity of Tor users, 
especially when researchers publish the collected data. Even when the data is not 
published in an obvious fashion, the adversary may still be able to carry out some 
linkage attacks, based on their background knowledge of the users. To that end, 
doing Tor experiments directly on the live Tor network is not an appropriate 
direction in Tor research. 
2.3 LASTor [50] 
Akhoondi et al. designed a Tor client called LASTor, which is claimed to be able 
to significantly reduce the latency of data transmission by 25%, compared to the 
default Tor client, by choosing the anonymous Tor path based on the Tor nodes’ 
geolocation information. In addition, the authors developed an algorithm, which 
is said to be able to detect paths on which an AS can correlate traffic between two 
ends. At the end of their paper, the authors announced their plan to publish the 
LASTor client for public use. 
However, at the time of conducting this study, the LASTor client has not yet 
been made available to the end users. Implementation of the proposal was likely 
unfeasible because the authors did not carefully consider the issue of traffic 
bottlenecking of the Tor network in their proposal. 
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2.4 Aaron Jonson et al.[51] 
Among many specific contributions of this study, the creation of TorPS, a 
realistic Tor path simulator, allowed Jonson et al. to calculate the time needed for 
an AS or IX (Internet Exchange point) to deanonymize an anonymous circuit. The 
authors took into account 3 ASes and IX adversaries, as observed in their data, 
and found that the chance of an AS compromising the identity of the Tor user by 
a correlation attack is 1.6% for the top 3 ASes in their study. 
2.5 RAPTOR[52] 
Although the threat of AS-level adversaries has been discussed for more than a 
decade, Sun et al. recently introduced RAPTOR, which is a suite of renewed attack 
techniques that can be utilized by an AS-level adversary to deanonymize Tor users. 
Since Tor communication is done with Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), the 
authors found that an AS-level adversary on the reverse path of a transmission 
can make use of TCP acknowledgment packets to strengthen its correlation attack 
on the privacy of Tor users. 
In more detail, RAPTOR encompasses three small attack techniques: 
1. Exploiting the asymmetric nature of the Internet to conduct traffic 
analysis and correlation attacks at both ends of the Tor communication. 
2. Exploiting the dynamic change in the Internet topology to increase the 
chance that a particular adversarial AS can appear simultaneously on 
both ends of the Tor communication. 
3. Manipulating Internet routing policy through BGP hijacking (to locate 
guard relays used by the client) and BGP interception (to perform traffic 
analysis). 
With these techniques, the group was able to deanonymize Tor users with up 
to 95% accuracy by using asymmetric traffic correlation exclusively. 
Although the group was successful in demonstrating the RAPTOR attacks, the 
method they applied to model Tor users and intended destination hosts is not 
reliable because they only used 100 nodes hosted in the PlanetLab [38] network, 
with 50 nodes playing the role of Tor clients, and the other 50 nodes playing the 
role of intended destination hosts. In our opinion, this method is not sufficient to 
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represent real clients and the most likely visited websites in the current Tor 
network. As a result, although the RAPTOR attack techniques may work to some 
extent when employed in the live Tor network, the statistical results of this study 
are questionable. 
2.6 Joshua Juen et al. [53] 
The work by Juen et al., although not new, again showed that AS-level routing 
predictions should not be heavily relied upon for creating AS-aware Tor clients to 
mitigate AS-level adversaries. The authors found that AS paths predicted by AS 
inference techniques differ from traceroute measurements 80% of the time. 
Nonetheless, one of the drawbacks of this study is that the authors passively 
relied on traceroute results submitted by a limited group of only 28 volunteers 
who operate Tor exit relays, while there are more than 800 exit nodes in the Tor 
network, as we will mention in subsection 4.2.2. Furthermore, the authors did not 
reasonably investigate the websites that are likely visited by Tor users. Instead, 
they randomly ran the traceroute measurements from 28 volunteers’ Tor exits to 
an IP picked up within each of the approximately 500,000 prefixes acquired from 
the September 2013 Routing Information Bases of the Route Views routers. Thus, 
their findings may not be an accurate representation of the true threat posed by 
AS-level adversaries. 
2.7 Astoria [54] 
Nithyanand et al. performed an empirical study to measure the threat of AS-
level adversaries. They found that up to 40% of Tor paths generated by the current 
Tor path selection algorithm are susceptible to AS-level adversaries, 42% in the 
case of colluding adversarial ASes, and 82% in the case of state-level adversaries. 
The group then introduced Astoria, an AS-aware client, which is alleged to be 
able to reduce the above threats to 2%, under 5%, and 25% for AS-level 
adversaries, colluding adversaries ASes, and state-level adversaries, respectively.  
Although the source code Astoria was published last year, it has not been 
widely adopted. Perhaps, it is because the process of compiling source code of a 
large packet (about 462 MB after extracted) is too complicated for end users, 
particularly non-technical and non-Linux users. 
  19 
2.8 Cipollino [55] 
The study conducted a historical analysis to measure how the threat from AS-
level adversaries has changed over the past five years. Similar to [49], the authors 
showed that the threat posed by AS-level adversaries has grown, despite the 
dramatic increase in number of Tor relays over the last decade. For the use of 
interactive web surfing, the authors found that 31% of the anonymous paths are 
vulnerable to AS-level adversaries. For the mixed use of many applications 
simultaneously, such as Web, Bit Torrent, IRC, and email, 30% of the paths were 
found to be vulnerable. In addition, the authors proposed Cipollino, which is an 
improved version of Astoria [54]. As a key contribution of this study, Cipollino 
aims to improve pitfalls of the previous AS-aware Tor client (Astoria) to achieve 
better security against network-level adversaries. Cipollino primarily depends on 
PathCache [59] to compute AS paths for its AS-aware path selection algorithm. 
However, at the time of conducting this study in July 2016, PathCache [59] has 
not yet been made available for testing, and the source code of Cipollino has not 
been published. 
2.9 Research motivations  
Considering all of the aforementioned works, the threat of AS-level adversaries 
has been intensively studied for more than a decade. Unfortunately, none of the 
proposals has been successfully deployed and widely adopted by end users, 
particularly non-technical users, while the threat of AS-level adversaries still 
remains a long-standing problem. Moreover, most prior AS-aware Tor clients 
were published in the form of offline packets, which often consisted of a modified 
Tor client, and a snapshot of the Internet topology for users to run AS-path 
inferences themselves. There are two obvious drawbacks in this approach. First, 
it might be too complicated for non-technical Tor users to properly compile the 
source code, and to get the client updated when new versions of Tor Browser 
Bundle are released. Second, due to the dynamic nature of the Internet, the 
snapshot of Internet topology has to be updated continually to assure a near real-
time AS path inference. Therefore, in this study, we introduce ASmoniTor to 
improve upon those drawbacks and plan to provide it to end users. 
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Chapter 3 Anti-Raptor: Anti routing attack on 
privacy for a securer and scalable Tor 
The proposal of anti-Raptor in this chapter is an investigation [60] conducted 
during the master’s study of the author. It was accepted by the 17th IEEE 
International Conference on Advanced Communications Technology. 
3.1 AS-level adversaries: problem revisited with real-time 
data analysis 
At the time of this study, we re-analyzed the AS-diversity in the Tor network. 
By examining the consensus network status document retrieved at 12:00 UCT on 
March 27th, 2015, using Stem Python library [61], we found that although there 
were 6697 relays in the network, they were distributed among just 1220 unique 
ASes 1. Moreover, a large portion of the total number of relays are associated with 
a small group of ASes, as shown in Table 3. In fact, more than 30% of bandwidth 
(KB/s) and nearly 25% of relays are allocated within the top 10 ASes, which may 
attract adversaries to exploit these ASes and try to sniff traffic traversing to/from 
them in order to conduct correlation attacks. 
Table 3: The 10 ASes containing the greatest number of relays 
ASN Cumulative BW % BW Total Unique Relays % Relays 
16276 3592823 11.65 401 5.99 
24940 2507641 8.13 302 4.51 
3320 74010 0.24 194 2.90 
7922 44446 0.14 178 2.66 
12876 3125003 10.13 146 2.18 
6830 59479 0.19 124 1.85 
20473 121342 0.39 80 1.19 
701 105370 0.34 78 1.16 
36351 61310 0.20 77 1.15 
12322 66531 0.22 68 1.02 
Total 9757955 31.64 1648 24.61 
                                                   
1 We map IP to AS using http://ipinfo.io/. The API uses MaxMind’s datasets [76] to provide IP 
lookup service. 
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Recently, Sun et al. introduced RAPTOR [52], which is a suite of attack 
techniques that can be used by AS-level adversaries to compromise the anonymity 
of Tor users. The authors in [52] tested RAPTOR in the live Tor network and 
succeeded in compromising user anonymity (for ethical reasons, their 
experiments were tested within self-created Tor relays so that no actual user’s 
privacy was compromised). In spite of successfully conducting real attacks on self-
created relays, Sun et al. provided limited samples and self-created AS topology 
graphs to demonstrate their attacks, which does not reflect a more complex reality 
of the Tor network. Therefore, in order to gain a more comprehensive insight into 
the current threat posed by AS-level adversaries, we use real-time data collected 
from the Tor network to identify ASes at which a threat like RAPTOR could occur.   
Table 4: Top 10 ASes that cover a large proportion of bandwidth 
ASN Cumulative BW % BW Total Unique Relays % Relays 
16276 3592823 11.65 401 5.99 
12876 3125003 10.13 146 2.18 
24940 2507641 8.13 302 4.51 
8972 1568756 5.09 60 0.90 
24961 1364022 4.42 54 0.81 
60781 805707 2.61 57 0.85 
37560 599144 1.94 3 0.04 
43350 527741 1.71 10 0.15 
51395 520938 1.69 22 0.33 
13030 506128 1.64 19 0.28 
Total 15117903 49.02 1074 16.04 
Because previous works often focused on ASes containing the majority of relays, 
an analysis similar to the one presented in Table 3 (in which ASes are sorted by 
the number of relays they contain), might have been seen before. However, it is 
expected that a select group of ASes would have a relatively large view of the 
overall Tor network since the original Internet availability is unevenly distributed. 
Unlike other works, we also analyze the real-time data from Tor’s consensus file 
and sort the ASes in Table 4 by cumulative relay bandwidth. Interestingly, there 
are 7 ASes that do not appear in Table 3, but that appear in Table 4 with high 
rankings. In other words, there is a paradox in which some ASes contain very few 
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relays, but account for a striking amount of bandwidth of the overall network, and 
vice versa. With the top 3 ASes remaining from Table 3, the 10 ASes in Table 4 
cover roughly 50% of the total bandwidth of the Tor network. 
Owing to the recent bandwidth-based path selection algorithm, this group of 
ASes is an ideal target of AS-level adversaries, especially those ASes that do not 
contain a large number of relays but account for a significant amount of 
bandwidth. For example, AS37560 contains only 3 relays (46.246.46.27, 
46.246.32.223, and 197.231.221.211), but occupies nearly 2% of the whole 
network’s bandwidth, as highlighted in Table 4. A summary of these 3 relays is 
provided in Table 5. 
Table 5: Relays in AS37560 
IP BW Fast Guard Exit Country Multi-origin 
46.246.46.27 26000 ● ●  SE AS42708 
46.246.32.223 144 ●  ● SE AS42708 
197.231.221.211 573000 ● ● ● LR None 
Although AS37560 was not listed in Table 3 and is only at rank #7 in Table 4, 
by hosting only 3 fast guard/exit relays, its probability of being selected as a guard 
or an exit is even higher than AS3320 (rank #3) and AS7922 (rank #4) in Table 3. 
We use Compass [62] to validate this conclusion. At the time of writing this paper, 
the overall probabilities of AS37560, AS3320 or AS7922 being chosen as a guard 
AS or an exit AS are 0.14%|2.63%, 0.02%|0.02% and 0.00%|0.06% respectively.  
In this case, without any apparent evidence, we cannot intuitively conclude that 
AS37560, or any of its relays, is an adversary. However, due to Tor’s current 
design (i.e., relays are selected by a bandwidth-based algorithm, and Tor 
anonymous circuits are created in a manner that relays in a circuit do not belong 
to the same /16 subnet), the ones who have control over particular ASes, such as 
ISPs or government agencies, would have no difficulty carrying out a correlation 
attack by following these steps: 
1. Locating ASes which have distinctly fast guards/exits but do not host many 
relays (e.g., AS37560, AS43350) 
2. Injecting another fast exit/guard, which does not belong to the same /16 
subnet as the guard/exit detected in step 1, into the same AS 
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3. Snooping at AS-level to conduct the correlation attack with a lower cost 
since there are only few relays in the anonymity set hosted in that AS  
Using these steps, the adversary does not even need to conduct BGP hijacking 
or intercepting attacks to monitor Tor traffic, as mentioned in RAPTOR [52].  
Despite numerous proposals to configure the Tor client to pick up relays 
located in different countries [50] in order to avoid picking up IP addresses hosted 
under the same AS, our real-time data analysis shows that relays 46.246.46.27 
and 46.246.32.223 are hosted in Sweden (SE) and relay 197.231.221.211 is hosted 
in Liberia (LR), regardless of operating under the same AS (AS37560). Therefore, 
the approach proposed in [50] is not effective enough to mitigate AS-level 
adversaries if a client accidentally uses one of the followings Tor paths:  
 (46.246.46.27, any middle relay, 197.231.221.211) 
 (197.231.221.211, any middle relay, 46.246.32.223) 
Next, for the purpose of completeness, we keep using AS37560 as a real-life 
case to demonstrate how the interdependent and dynamic Internet topology (#2 
RAPTOR attack fashion) and BGP intercepting (#3 RAPTOR attack fashion) 
could increase the ability of an AS to monitor more Tor traffic. 
In order to visualize AS37560 using Internet topology, we investigated the 
latest dataset of AS relationships made available by CAIDA [63], which was 
retrieved on March 27th, 2015. We then obtained the graph in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: AS37560’s Internet topology visualization 
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We found that AS37560 is a customer AS of 3 other provider ASes (AS174, 
AS42708 and AS16150) and has AS50304 as a peer AS. These connections 
indicate that the three provider ASes are the main gates for traffic traversing 
from/to AS37560 to/from the entire Internet. Consequently, the threat (if any) of 
a correlation attack posed by AS37560 is propagated to the 3 provider ASes, and 
the total probabilities of being chosen as guard/exit ASes should also be 
propagated because they also have the ability to monitor the traffic of AS37560. 
The recent design of Compass [62] does not take this circumstance into account. 
Therefore, we re-calculate the approximate probability of being chosen as a guard 
AS or an exit AS for these 3 ASes, as shown in Table 6. In terms of threat-
propagated awareness, the probability of being chosen as a guard AS or an exit AS 
for each provider AS should be increased by x, with x smaller than the guard 
probability and the exit probability of AS37560. 
Table 6: Re-calculated probabilities of being chosen as a guard AS or an exit AS 
due to the interdependent nature of Internet topology 
AS Number of Relays Guard Probability Exit Probability 
37560 3 0.14 2.63 
174 9 0.73 + (x < 0.14) 0 + (x < 2.63) 
42708 15 0 + (x < 0.14) 0.02 + (x < 2.63) 
16150 0 0 + (x < 0.14) 0 + (x < 2.63) 
Due to the complexity of Internet routing policies, and since traffic allocation 
between ASes is confidential information in contracts between ISPs, we cannot 
truly know how much traffic is allocated among these 3 provider ASes. In contrast, 
we can be sure that if one of these 3 ASes goes down due to infrastructure 
maintenance, corruption or a DDOS attack, the remaining two ASes will transmit 
more traffic of AS37560. If two of them are down, the remaining one will be able 
to monitor the entire traffic of AS37560. The interdependent and dynamic 
Internet topology could increase the ability of an AS to monitor more Tor traffic 
by this process. 
Next, by mapping IPs to ASes in Table 5, using Hurricane Electric’s BGP toolkit 
[64], we found that the first two IPs are announced by two ASes, AS37560 and 
AS42708, as indicated in the last column of Table 6. However, only AS37560, with 
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a more specific advertised prefix (i.e., 46.246.32.0/19) is retrieved by 
https://ipinfo.io/ in Tables 3 and Table 4. AS42708, with a less specific advertised 
prefix (i.e., 46.246.0.0/17), is not retrieved. We also found that AS42708 is a 
provider AS of AS37560, as illustrated in Figure 7.  
At the time of retrieving data from Compass on March 27th, 2015, there was no 
Tor relay operating under AS16150. However, as discussed in RAPTOR attack 
fashion #3, AS16150 can still monitor Tor traffic by maliciously advertising a more 
specific prefix than AS42708, such as 46.246.0.0/18. In this case, the traffic is 
still redirected to its correct destination, so AS16150 would successfully snoop on 
Tor’s traffic traversing from/to the entire Internet to/from AS37560. BGP 
hijacking can also be conducted in a similar manner with BGP intercepting, but it 
would not last for a long time since hijacking BGP is just a black hole that does 
not send response packets to the original sender, thus communication would 
eventually drop. That is a scenario in which an AS-level adversary can abuse a 
BGP intercepting attack to increase its ability to sniff Tor traffic. 
3.2 Design goals of anti-Raptor 
We propose anti-Raptor as a countermeasure to the AS-level attack. Since we 
showed in section 1.2.3 that an increase in number of clients results in a higher 
bandwidth cost of serving the consensus document, and because the recent 
scalability problem has not been efficiently handled, our proposal is designed in 
a manner to avoid introducing unnecessary load to the network. In particular, 
load that is directly related to the number of clients, which will likely result in 
additional scalability problems. 
Although RAPTOR is referred to in this study as the newest attack technique 
on privacy in Tor and it was first published on March 13th, 2015, our proposal is 
not merely a countermeasure to this type of attack. Instead, it has been studied 
and designed as a long term solution after Edward Snowden confirmed the NSA 
has an autonomous system called MonsterMind [65], which is said to be able to 
intercept network traffic flows. Therefore, our proposal is not just a reaction to 
RAPTOR, but rather a long-term carefully planned countermeasure to mitigate 
the threat of AS-level adversaries in general. 
  26 
3.3 System architecture 
First of all, it is important to note that we cannot dictate where volunteers 
should run their relays for two primary reasons. First, Tor is operated by a 
network of volunteer-based relays that are not evenly distributed on the Internet, 
since the Internet availability is not evenly distributed around the globe. Second, 
different ISPs and governments have different Internet policies. As a result, 
mitigating real-world threats of AS-level adversaries, like the case of AS37560 
discussed in section 3.1, is not a trivial task. 
To negate the threat of AS-level adversaries, we suggest that Tor clients initiate 
Tor paths in an AS-aware manner in which AS paths between the client and the 
guard, as well as between the exit and the destination, are measured. 
 
Figure 8: Design of anti-Raptor 
 𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐶𝐺: ASes set in forward link between client and guard 
 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐶𝐺: ASes set in reverse link between client and guard 
 𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐸𝐷: ASes set in forward link between exit and destination 
 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐸𝐷: ASes set in reverse link between exit and destination 
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3.3.1 AS-awareness 
In anti-Raptor, we suggest that an AS topology is maintained and distributed 
to guard and exit relays by trusted central directory authority servers. It is a 
directed graph of the Internet AS-level topology that will be used by guard and 
exit relays to look up four AS paths: 𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐶𝐺, 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐶𝐺, 𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐸𝐷, and 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐸𝐷. In the 
current Tor design, anonymous circuits are built based on the bandwidth-
preferred algorithm, and relays are selected so that they do not belong to the same 
/16 subnet. However, as shown in section 3.1, these constraints do not effectively 
and efficiently mitigate AS-level adversaries. Therefore, clients should pick up 
circuit in an AS-aware manner to avoid using circuits in which the same AS 
appears at both ends of the communication. Hence, before initiating a particular 
circuit, the client sends two requests to check AS paths between herself and the 
guard, and between the exit and the destination at the same time she sends 
requests to open the virtual circuit. After receiving requests, the guard and the 
exit look up the AS topology file to measure 𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐶𝐺, 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐶𝐺, 𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐸𝐷, and 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐸𝐷, 
sending the results to the client. Based on the measured ASes sets received from 
the guard and the exit, the client implements this algorithm: 
AS-awareness algorithm 
if: 
(𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐶𝐺 ⋃ 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐶𝐺) ⋂ (𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐸𝐷 ⋃ 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐸𝐷) = ∅ 
then initiate circuit 
else drop  
go to next circuit in the list of pre-emptively built circuits 
3.3.2 Scalability 
Our approach is similar to LASTor [50] in term of the AS-path measuring 
procedure. However, LASTor requires Tor users to initially download 13 MB of 
AS-related data, including inter-AS links, AS three-tuples, and AS path lengths. 
We already knew that AS topology is very dynamic, thus maintaining such files 
from the client side in order to have near real-time AS-path inferences is not easy, 
and it may cause more loading overhead in the Tor network. On the contrary, our 
design only requires guard and exit relays to download the AS topology, instead 
of all clients. The AS topology only needs to be updated when a new one is 
published by directory authority servers. One may question whether the size of 
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the response packets, containing AS-path measurements, from guard and exit 
relays to the client, would add more load to the Tor network. However, we already 
analyzed the AS topology from CAIDA [63] and found that average paths have 
only 4 ASes. Based on that information, response packets containing AS numbers 
will not cause serious loading overhead to the Tor network. Additionally, to 
preserve the recent Tor’s approach of improving performance by using a 
bandwidth-based algorithm, we apply anti-Raptor directly on the top of the list of 
pre-emptively built circuits. From top to bottom (i.e., from fast circuits to slow 
circuits), all circuits are checked before being initiated. 
3.4 Discussions 
In a compatible manner with the proposal of Dingledine et al. [66], if the guard 
is stable and used for a long period of time in future Tor design, then cost for 
computing (𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐶𝐺  ⋃ 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐶𝐺 )can be reduced, since the client only needs to 
request the guard to report (𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐶𝐺 ⋃ 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐶𝐺) for the first time and reuses the 
result until a reasonable time has passed (up to 9 months in future design [66]). 
In [52], the authors suggest that the user should choose a closer guard relay to 
lower the possibility that an adversarial AS appears in the channel between herself 
and the guard. However, such an approach may make the user’s traffic 
distinguishable or cause traffic bottlenecking issues. Thus, the approach of 
shorter-Tor-path AS still needs to be carefully researched and will be discussed 
briefly in Chapter 4. As we found that the average distance between two arbitrary 
ASes is 4, future work may use this number to estimate how many ASes a path 
should have to negate the threat of AS-level adversaries. In addition, depending 
on the length of the AS path, one can decide after how long the (𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐶𝐺 ⋃ 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐶𝐺)  
should be re-measured. The shorted AS paths are, the less dynamic they become. 
The authors in [52] also recommended that Tor advocate its voluntary relay 
operators to run Tor relays with a prefix longer than /24 to alleviate BGP hijacking 
and intercepting attacks. However, as mentioned above, it is not easy to dictate 
where volunteers should run their relays. Furthermore, BGP hijacking and BGP 
interception occur when an AS tries to advertise a more specific prefix for various 
ill intensions. In other words, when this kind of attack occurs, the entire Internet 
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would likely see two different ASes announce a common range of prefixes. 
However, this assumption is not always true because while multi-origin routes 
can be an indication of BGP hijacking, they can also occur for other reasons. For 
example, they could occur in case of an organization not having their own AS, thus 
requesting many ISPs to announce their IP space for them, or in the case of 
anycast usage from various ASes. By observing a BGP toolkit provided by 
Hurricane Electric Internet service [64], we found that daily updated multi-origin 
routes include 6600 unique prefixes, half of which are /24 subnets, advertised by 
14000 different ASes. Therefore, if we drop any circuit based solely on the AS 
testing result, without carefully taking this circumstance into account, we would 
waste Tor’s limited resources, since the phenomenon of multi-origin routes 
occurs frequently. To that end, we suggest that trusted central directory authority 
servers also observe the multi-origin routes and blacklist those ASes that 
advertise the same prefix for the first time, and remove them from this blacklist 
after a “trustable” period of time has passed. The list of blacklisted ASes should 
be distributed together with consensus (it should not be distributed by default, 
but only to those clients who opt for an AS-aware path selection algorithm). 
Additionally, we can take complete advantage of bandwidth scanning authority 
servers to detect abnormal changes in the Internet AS-level topology, while 
sending packets to guard and exit relays to test their bandwidth. 
Finally, it is worth noting that a threat to our design only occurs when both 
guard and exit relays try to strategically, systematically, and simultaneously lie 
about the AS paths of 𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐶𝐺, 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐶𝐺, 𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐸𝐷, and 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐸𝐷, preventing the client 
from recognizing that she is going to use a circuit in which the same adversarial 
AS will appear at both ends. Nevertheless, thanks to the conventional wisdom of 
the three-relay structure of a typical Tor circuit, the guard cannot know which exit 
is at the opposite side of the circuit, and vice versa. A situation in which both guard 
and exit relays know that they are handling the same circuit and provide false 
responses about AS paths is unlikely to occur. Integrating anti-Raptor proposal 
into the current Tor network would require major restructuring; therefore, we will 
introduce ASmoniTor in Chapter 5, which is a stand-alone platform that operates 
based on the anti-Raptor algorithm. 
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Chapter 4 Shorter-Tor-Path as a Solution 
As briefly mentioned in previous studies [49], [50], [52], a shorter AS path can 
effectively help to reduce the risk of an adversarial AS being able to compromise 
the anonymity of Tor users through correlation or RAPTOR attacks. Although 
such an approach is promising, no previous works have examined its feasibility. 
In this chapter, we examine the possibility of implementing this approach by 
studying the potential distributions of censored Internet users, guard nodes, exit 
nodes, and most likely visited websites via Tor. By visualizing these distributions 
on a map, we preliminarily examine the possibility of implementing this approach.  
4.1 Premise 
First of all, it is necessary to define what a shorter Tor path is. Since the purpose 
of this study is to find a better method to help Tor users negate the risk of being 
deanonymized by AS-level adversaries, we are interested in shortening the routes 
between the two ends of anonymous Tor paths. In other words, we aim to shorten 
routes between (1) the client and the guard, (2) the exit and the intended 
destination host, and (3) both (1) and (2) at the same time, which is the most 
desired target. In this context, a shorter Tor path should not be confused with a 
shorter Tor path from the guard node, via the middle node, to the exit node, 
because the attack targets of AS-level adversaries are the two ends of a Tor path, 
but not the middle node. Therefore, by shortening the routes at both ends of a Tor 
path, we can reduce the probability that an adversarial AS appears at the two ends 
of that Tor anonymous circuit.  
4.2 Modeling the involved parties 
In order to determine whether or not the aforementioned approach is possible, 
we have to know where Tor clients, guard nodes, exit nodes, and the most likely 
visited websites are located. The shorter-Tor-path approach can only be realized 
if clients are located close to guards, and exits are close to destination hosts. In 
order to be considered “close”, the route between two entities must be short in the 
concept of network distance, but not necessarily physical distance. 
Although an IP address is not always tied to a physical location and its GeoIP 
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information may be incorrect at times. The distribution of IP addresses and 
Internet users provides a good approximation of the distribution of the human 
population. Similarly, Internet backbones and data centers are designed and 
located in accordance with the distribution of the human population to facilitate 
economical routing. 
To that end, we employ the GeoIP data to map IP addresses according to their 
physical locations (i.e., longitude and latitude), with the hope of gaining some 
insight into the distribution of Tor users, guard nodes, exit nodes and most likely 
visited websites. Finally, we present these distributions on a map in the following 
subsections. 
4.2.1 Where are the clients? 
As described in Figure 1, there are only two entities in the Tor network that can 
obtain IP addresses of Tor users: directory servers and guard nodes. Tor users 
need to download the consensus document from the directory authority server to 
maintain an up-to-date view of the Tor network, while guard nodes are the 
entrances for directly connecting Tor users to enter the Tor network. Therefore, 
one of the most effective ways to obtain IP addresses of Tor users is to create many 
fast and stable guard nodes, and to enable them to become mirror servers of the 
directory servers. Using this method, we can obtain and log a sample of Tor user 
IP addresses, the locations of which likely reflect the real distribution of Tor users. 
However, with the issue of ethics regarding the collection and publication of 
Tor users’ real IP addresses [58], [67], we opt to reuse the analyzed results made 
available by Tor Metrics project [24]. The following is a table of the top 10 
countries by number of directly connecting users, which make up nearly 65% of 
the total number of Tor direct daily users. 
Table 7: Top 10 countries by directly connecting users 
  Country Mean daily users   Country Mean daily users 
1 United States  359432 (19.88 %) 6 Italy  49869 (2.76 %) 
2 Russia  206737 (11.43 %) 7 Spain  49053 (2.71 %) 
3 Germany  177034 (9.79 %) 8 Brazil  48945 (2.71 %) 
4 France  108474 (6.00 %) 9 Japan  47375 (2.62 %) 
5 United Kingdom  82582 (4.57 %) 10 Canada  39653 (2.19 %) 
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4.2.2 Where are the guards and exits? 
The Tor consensus file was fetched at 16:30 UCT on July 9th, 2016, and 
analyzed to determine the location of most guard and exit nodes. In total, we were 
able to retrieve 2277 guard nodes and 850 exit nodes, which were then mapped 
using GeoIP information. The distribution of these nodes is presented in Figure 9 
and Figure 10.  
 
Figure 9: Distribution of guard nodes 
As visualized on the map, most guard nodes are hosted in Europe and the 
United States. Table 8 shows the analyzed results of the top 10 countries hosting 
the largest number of guard nodes. 
Table 8: Top 10 countries hosting the largest number of guard nodes 
  Country Guard Percentage  Country Guard  Percentage 
1 FR 471 20.69% 6 SE 100 4.39% 
2 DE 422 18.53% 7 CA 97 4.26% 
3 US 298 13.09% 8 RU 75 3.29% 
4 NL 204 8.96% 9 CH 67 2.94% 
5 GB 112 4.92% 10 RO 50 2.20% 
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Figure 10: Distribution of exit nodes 
Similar to the distribution of guard nodes, exit nodes are also mostly located in 
Europe and the United States. However, the number of exit nodes is only about 
1/3 the number of guard nodes. Table 9 shows the summarized result of the top 
10 countries where exit nodes are hosted. 
Table 9: Top 10 countries hosting the largest number of exit nodes1 
  Country Exit Percentage   Country Exit Percentage 
1 US 140 15.42% 6 CA 45 4.96% 
2 NL 110 12.11% 7 RO 43 4.74% 
3 FR 83 9.14% 8 SE 39 4.30% 
4 DE 79 8.70% 9 RU 37 4.07% 
5 GB 51 5.62% 10 CH 31 3.41% 
As a result, we can see that although rankings differ slightly between Table 8 
and Table 9, the 10 countries hosting the largest number of both guard nodes and 
exit nodes are the same. 
                                                   
1 Countries in Table 8 and 9 are noted by ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 codes (two-letter country codes). 
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4.2.3 Where are potential intended destination hosts? 
Perhaps the easiest way to acquire IP addresses of websites, which are often 
visited by Tor users, is to create a large number of exit nodes, distributed in 
different locations, and monitor traffic from those exit nodes to the visited 
destinations. Nevertheless, due to the anonymous nature of the Tor network, and 
because of ethical concerns with logging and publishing websites visited by Tor 
users, it is not a trivial task to obtain a complete list of the most common intended 
destination hosts of Tor users. This type of method should not be employed, as 
was discussed in section 2.2. 
Since doing experiments on the live the Tor network directly is not 
recommended, some previous works determined the most visited websites using 
author opinion[48], or third party statistics of the most visited websites on the 
Internet [50], [54]. The authors in [50] modeled the destination hosts using the 
top 200 most visited websites in the United States, as determined by Quantcast 
[68], while the authors in [54] used the top 100 most visited websites, as analyzed 
by Alexa, along with 100 country-specific sensitive webpages collected by the 
Citizen Lab [69]. 
However, after careful examination of the websites used in the studies 
described above, we argue that the most visited websites in the normal Internet 
environment are not the same as the most visited websites via the Tor network. 
For instance, in the top site lists obtained from both Quantcast and Alexa1, there 
are many shopping (e.g., Amazon, eBay, Rakuten, Alibaba, etc.) and electronic 
wallet (e.g., PayPal) websites. Theses websites know the identity of their users, 
even when they are accessed via Tor, thus it is not necessary to use Tor to access 
such webpages. The authors in [54] used a better method to model intended 
websites by integrating 100 country-specific topic-sensitive webpages collected by 
the Citizen Lab. However, this list of websites was assembled by GlobalVoices 
Blockpage Gallery [70], which states on their homepage that the list was 
generated using data from 2008 and does not reflect current online censorship. 
Furthermore, the GlobalVoices Blockpage Gallery project collects blocked 
                                                   
1 A list of the top 100 websites obtained from Alexa on July 13th, 2016, is provided in the 
Appendix. 
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websites reported by Internet users, while state-sponsored surveillance activities 
are not limited to blocking websites. Sometimes, repressive regimes cannot 
completely prevent their citizens from accessing censored websites due to the 
rapid development of pro-privacy and anti-censorship tools. Instead, they allow 
citizens to freely access censored websites, but secretly monitor their traffic to put 
them into the government’s watch list, or even black list. 
Taking into account of all the aforementioned issues, we can conclude that 
none of the prior studies’ modeling methods are reliable enough to accurately 
reflect the most visited websites via Tor Browser, while knowing the correct 
destination hosts plays a very important role in measuring the risk posed by AS-
level adversaries. 
To improve upon the pitfalls of previous studies, we carefully review the annual 
survey of Freedom on the Net [71], conducted by the Freedom House, to examine 
which content is often monitored, censored, or blocked on the Internet. According 
to the report, the most censored topics include those that criticize or oppose the 
authorities, political opposition, satire, social commentary, adult-oriented 
material, and GLBT-related content. Fortunately, in addition to analyzing the 
most popular websites, Alexa also clusters them into categories similar to the 
above censored topics. Because of the similarity between the clustered websites 
and censored topics on the Internet, we fetched a list of these categories1 and 
displayed them on map, as shown in Figures 12 through 18. 
Comparing the maps displayed in Figures 12 through 18 with the map shown 
in Figure 11 reveals a visible difference between the distribution of topic-oriented 
destination hosts and the distribution of the top 100 websites. While non-
categorized top 100 websites are evenly distributed throughout North America, 
European countries, and Northeast Asia, the categorized websites are mostly 
hosted in the United States and Europe. This comparison proves that using the 
non-categorized websites is inappropriate for modeling the websites likely visited 
by Tor users because it may yield unreliable results when measuring the threat of 
AS-level adversaries. 
                                                   
1 We also append these lists of categorized websites obtained from Alexa on July 13th, 2016 at the 
end of the thesis in Appendix Section. 
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Figure 11: Top 100 websites analyzed by Alexa 
 
Figure 12: Top 100 websites in the politics category 
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Figure 13: Top 100 in the "criticism and opposition of authorities" category 
 
Figure 14: Top 100 websites in the media industry category 
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Figure 15: Top 100 websites in the activism category 
 
Figure 16: Top 100 websites in the support group category 
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Figure 17: Top 100 websites in the GLBT category 
 
Figure 18: Top 100 websites in the adult category 
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4.2.4 Putting things together 
Can we shorten routes between users and guard nodes? 
By doing some calculations between Table 7 and Table 8, we can conclude that 
the approach of shortening routes between Tor users and guard nodes is feasible 
in some countries. In other countries, this approach needs further research to 
ensure that it will not cause a traffic bottleneck at guard nodes. As shown in Table 
10, we calculated the ratio of direct users/one guard node to demonstrate this 
conclusion. 
Table 10: Ratio of direct users/one guard node in the top 10 countries by 
number of directly connecting users 
Country Mean daily users Guard Ratio Feasibility 
France 108474 471 230 Possible 
Canada 39653 97 409 
 
Germany 177034 422 420 
United Kingdom 82582 112 737 
United States 359432 298 1206 
Italy 49869 32 1558 
Russia 206737 75 2756 
Spain 49053 8 6132 
Japan 47375 1 47375 
Brazil 48945 1 48945 Impossible 
By shortening routes between users and guard nodes, we attempted to keep 
traffic entering the Tor network as local as possible to avoid having to traverse via 
many ASes, thus reducing the probability of an adversarial AS appearing. 
Currently, there are around 2 million daily users and around 2000 guard nodes 
in the Tor network, so we can approximate that the average number of users 
handled by each guard node is 1000. Basing on this result and the ratios in Table 
7, it is possible to localize the entering Tor route in France, Canada, Germany and 
the UK, but it is difficult to implement this approach for Tor users in the United 
States, Italy, and Russia. It is nearly impossible to implement this approach for 
users in Spain, Japan and Brazil, since guard node(s) in these countries would be 
saturated by the large number of connections and circuits if many users tried to 
connect to Tor at once. 
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Can we shorten routes between exits and intended destination hosts? 
As for shortening the outgoing Tor route from exit nodes to intended 
destination hosts, we overlap Figure 10 with Figures 13 through 18 to evaluate the 
approach’s feasibility. Our findings indicate it is feasible to implement the 
approach of shortening the outgoing route, since most exit nodes are located in 
European and the United States, while most intended websites are also hosted in 
North America and Europe. 
4.3 Even shorter paths cannot help: a remaining dilemma 
4.3.1 When is Tor useless? 
Although Tor is one of the most popular tools used to protect the anonymity of 
Internet users, there is a situation in which at least one AS-level adversary can 
deanonymize the Tor user, something we will call the “loop phenomenon”. It 
occurs when a client uses Tor to visit a website that is also hosted in the same AS 
as her ISP. In this situation, incoming traffic from the client to the guard node has 
to pass through the AS of the user’s ISP, regardless of the guard node’s location. 
At the same time, outgoing traffic from the exit node to the intended website 
server also has to pass through the AS of the client’s ISP. As a consequence, the 
ISP of the Tor user possesses an AS that is in an ideal position to carry out a 
correlation attack. This phenomenon is also likely to occur when the user visits a 
website hosted in her home country (i.e., the website is not necessarily hosted in 
the same ISP of the user). The following case illustrates the above scenario. For 
this example, a Tor user (in this case, my own PC, located in JP) accessed 
http://english.kyodonews.jp using Tor browser. Detail of the client, guard, exit 
nodes, and destination host is presented in Table 11. 
Table 11: A case study of Tor's dilemma1 
Role Global IP address AS Number Country 
Tor client 119.107.206.177 AS2516 Japan 
Guard node 23.239.10.144 AS63949 US 
Exit node 77.247.181.163 AS43350 Netherlands 
Destination host 202.248.158.165 AS2510 Japan 
                                                   
1 We retrieve ASN and country of an IP using http://ipinfo.io/. 
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Figure 19: Accessing Kyodo News via Tor browser 
To prove the statement above, we determined the set of ASes appearing 
between the two ends of the Tor circuit shown in Figure 19. They include the ASes 
that appear between the client PC (119.107.206.177) and the guard node 
(23.239.10.144), as well as the ASes that appear between the exit node 
(77.247.181.163) and the server of Kyodo News (202.248.158.165). When 
appearing at both ends of the Tor path, an AS is in an ideal position to carry out a 
correlation attack to deanonymize the client. 
There are two components often used to measure the routing information of 
an AS path between two points on the Internet: control-plane and data-plane. 
Control-plane is used for measurements in which we have physical control over 
the computational resource. For instance, when applied to traceroute 
measurement, control-plane yields a reliable result since it is obtained in a real-
time fashion. On the other hand, although less reliable, data-plane is utilized 
when we do not have physical access to the resource and must rely on known data 
to infer the routing information of the AS path. 
We ran a traceroute measurement from the client PC to the guard node to get 
a real-time AS path that packets traverse from the client to the guard node. The 
AS path inference technique (data-plane) was used to find out the ASes that the 
route traverses from the exit node to the server of Kyodo News because we did not 
have physical access to the exit node. 
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Figure 20: Traceroute result from the client to the guard node 
 
Figure 21: Result of AS path inference from exit node to Kyodo News1 
                                                   
1 Note that the AS inference technique returned a list of AS paths in descending order of the 
probability that the route between two points would traverse on the real Internet. Packets sent 
from an IP address originating from AS43350 would mostly traverse via AS3257 and AS2516 
before arriving at AS2510, while this is less likely for the other paths shown below. 
PC-A385-Phong: ~ admin$ traceroute -a 23.239.10.144\ 
traceroute to 23.239.10.144, 64 hops max, 52 byte packets\ 
1 [AS56220] aterm.me (192.168.0.1) 3.423 ms 1.904 ms 1.747 ms\ 
4 [AS2516] 119.107.206.177 (119.107.206.177) 95.552 ms 112.055 ms\ 
5 [AS2516] 111.87.11.9 (111.87.11.9) 87.053 ms 92.328 ms 77.748 ms\ 
6 [AS2516] obpjbb205.int-gw.kddi.ne.jp (113.157.227.17) 102.017 ms\ 
7 [AS2516] pajbb002.int-gw.kddi.ne.jp (203.181.100.38) 206.227 ms\ 
8 [AS2516] ix-pa9.int-gw.kddi.ne.jp (111.87.3.58) 233.947 ms\ 
9 [AS3257] ae12.pao10.ip4.gtt.net (77.67.77.25) 205.316 ms 208.969 ms\ 
10 [AS3257] xe-2-1-7.nyc20.ip4.gtt.net (89.149.133.234) 1962.607 ms\ 
11 [AS3257] ip4.gtt.net (173.205.45.210) 1651.264 ms 1673.371 ms\ 
12 [AS8001] 209.123.10.77 (209.123.10.77) 1343.765 ms 276.309 ms\ 
13 [AS8001] 207.99.112.130 (207.99.112.130) 267.593 ms 249.936 ms\ 
14 [AS63949] switch-nacspare.linode.com (173.255.239.5) 248.076 ms\ 
15 [AS63949] tor.shamm.as (23.239.10.144) 273.352 ms 1468.360 ms\ 
16 [AS63949] tor.shamm.as (23.239.10.144) 1781.215 ms 274.452 ms\ 
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As highlighted in red in both Figure 20 and Figure 21, there is a very high 
probability that both AS3257 (Global Telecom & Technology) and AS2516 (KDDI 
CORPORATION) can monitor both ends of the Tor communication, thus being 
able to conduct a correlation attack to deanonymize the client and reveal that the 
client is using Tor to access Kyodo News. This situation becomes even worse if 
many ASes collude with one another to compromise the user’s anonymity. The 
worst case scenario is when a government passes laws requesting the 
collaboration of ISPs to monitor Internet traffic nation-wide. 
4.3.2 Extra hub + Tor as a potential solution 
In order to help Tor users to overcome the “loop phenomenon”, one possible 
solution is to use VPN servers that are located outside of users’ home country. 
Using foreign VPN servers helps to prevent an ISP from knowing whether or not 
Tor is being used to access a local website, since all of the user’s connections are 
encrypted in the VPN tunnel and the real IP address communicating with the 
guard node is outside of the user’s home country. We suggest the use of VPN Gate 
[72] because it is a network of volunteer-based public VPN servers that are widely 
distributed around the world, making it more feasible to implement. 
 
Figure 22: The distribution of VPN Gate servers (blue) and guard nodes (red) 
over the top 10 countries of daily direct connecting Tor users (highlighted) 
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Chapter 5 ASmoniTor 
In this chapter, we discuss the implementation of ASmoniTor, which is an 
autonomous system monitor for mitigating correlation attacks in the Tor network. 
ASmoniTor is an online platform created to assist Tor users by mitigating the 
threat of correlation attacks posed by AS-level adversaries while surfing the 
Internet with Tor Browser Bundle. For clarity, ASmoniTor is ideal for interactive 
web surfing users, but not for dark web and BitTorrent users. 
5.1 Design goal of ASmoniTor 
First of all, it is necessary to clarify that our ASmoniTor system does not aim to 
serve all types of Tor users because we do not truly know how many types of users 
exist within the Tor network. While some use Tor to access websites that are 
censored in their home country, others use it to protect their privacy and to 
maintain online anonymity in the midst of state-sponsored surveillance activities. 
According to [73], as a low-latency anonymous communication tool, Tor is often 
used for interactive web surfing. Therefore, we designed ASmoniTor to primarily 
serve this segment of users. 
With a simple user interface, ASmoniTor allows an end user to input two 
parameters: the set of ASes between herself and the guard, and the intended 
destination host. Based on the anti-Raptor algorithm [60], ASmoniTor will check 
all of Tor’s available Tor exit nodes to determine which nodes are unsafe for the 
user. Finally, a list of unsafe exit nodes is returned for the user to append to torrc1, 
which is a configuration file in the Tor browser. With these unsafe exit nodes 
appended to the configuration file, the Tor browser will avoid choosing them 
when creating circuits. As a result, the user is safe from correlation attacks posed 
by AS-level adversaries. 
5.2 Lessons learned from previous works 
As briefly mentioned in Section 2.9, the ultimate goal of this study is to improve 
remaining drawbacks of previous works that made their proposed AS-aware Tor 
                                                   
1 Although the location of the torrc file may change in future Tor Browser versions, at the time of 
composing this study, it is located at \Tor Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Tor\torrc. 
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clients less practical and thus not widely used by Tor users.  
First, most previous works only published the source code of an AS-aware Tor 
client, instead of a readily executable program. Substantial effort and specialized 
knowledge are required to properly compile the source code, which makes these 
AS-aware clients less accessible to the many non-technical Tor users. 
Furthermore, the Tor browser is updated almost monthly so the maintenance of 
these AS-aware Tor clients is cumbersome for the user. 
Second, most previously proposed AS-aware clients consist of a snapshot of 
Internet topology and/or pre-computed AS-paths. Edman et al. in [49] proposed 
a 2 MB packet, containing an AS topology snapshot and a prefix table for running 
the AS-awareness path selection. LASTor [50] requires Tor users to initially 
download 13 MB of AS-related data, including inter-AS links, AS three-tuples, and 
AS path lengths. Astoria [54] was introduced as a complete AS-aware Tor client 
with a packet size of 88.3 MB when compressed, and 462 MB when extracted. 
However, due to the dynamic nature of the Internet, the snapshot of the Internet 
topology has to be continually updated in order to assure near real-time AS path 
inferences. Thus, it is too complicated to use the above proposals offline. 
Third, not all Tor users have the same concern about the threat of AS-level 
adversaries. In particular, those who only use Tor to bypass censorships of their 
local ISPs or authorities. Thus, AS-aware path selection should not be 
implemented in the entire Tor network as proposed in anti-Raptor [60]. 
Considering these drawbacks, we aim to design ASmoniTor so that it operates 
independently from the Tor network and is easy for both technical and non-
technical users to use. In addition, the novel design of ASmoniTor will help to 
reduce errors of AS-path inference techniques, improving the accuracy of the AS-
aware path selection process. 
In most related works, the main issue was the privacy of Tor users while using 
third party APIs, such as online AS-path inference systems and GeoIP mapping 
tools, because such platforms may leak information of Tor users. However, in 
Subsection 5.3, we will demonstrate that ASmoniTor is designed with a high 
priority on user privacy. If the user follows our instructions, we cannot obtain any 
information about the user, despite being the developers of ASmoniTor. 
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5.3 System architecture 
ASmoniTor acts as a proxy to assist Tor users concerned about correlation 
attacks to communicate with other third-party APIs, including AS-path inference 
systems, and GeoIP mapping tools. By collecting data from those APIs, 
ASmoniTor aims to maintain a database, as shown in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23: Database of ASmoniTor 
As shown in Figure 23, the database of ASmoniTor contains three primary data 
elements: current Tor nodes, most visited websites, and AS paths between all 
current exit nodes and all the most visited websites. Since the Tor network 
publishes a new consensus file every hour, ASmoniTor is designed to fetch the 
consensus file and update its database when there is a new entry added. Similarly, 
data of topic-specific websites are fetched and frequently updated from Alexa, as 
described in subsection 4.2.3. 
After obtaining the newest data of both exit nodes and lists of likely visited 
websites, all AS paths between exit nodes and websites are computed using an AS-
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path inference API [57]. This dataset comprises of near real-time AS paths 
because the API uses the daily updated data of Route Views Project [74]. These 
AS paths are then stored in the database so when the user executes ASmoniTor, 
the system just needs to intersect the set of ASes inputted by the user with the 
precomputed AS paths determined by the anti-Raptor algorithm [60]. 
 
Figure 24: User interface of ASmoniTor 
As mentioned in Section 5.2, most previous works were deeply concerned 
about information leakage to third party APIs if the AS-aware path selection was 
done online. Therefore, we designed ASmoniTor so that the user can decide to 
what extent she wants to give away her information. The user just needs to input 
a list of AS numbers that appear between her PC and the guard node. The user 
can obtain this list by executing a traceroute measurement on her own machine. 
The measurement will return a list of ASes similar to Figure 20. In order to protect 
her information from being traced back or leaked, the user can mix up the 
order of AS numbers that she inputs into the first textbox on the ASmoniTor 
user interface. By mixing up the order, in spite of being the developers of 
ASmoniTor, we have no way of knowing which guard node the user is using or her 
real IP address since ASmoniTor can only be accessed using Tor browser. 
Although the order of AS numbers is mixed up to increase user anonymity 
while using ASmoniTor, it does not have any negative impact on the accuracy of 
the AS-aware path selection process because the anti-Raptor algorithm is not 
affected by the order of ASes in an AS-path. 
One of the key technical contributions of ASmoniTor design is that we let Tor 
users run traceroute measurements themselves and input the set of ASes obtained 
directly from their traceroute measurements. This approach is far more reliable 
than AS-path measurements done by inference techniques because the set of ASes 
is obtained directly from a real-time control-plane measurement. This feature 
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distinguishes ASmoniTor from prior proposals in which AS-path measurements 
are solely based on inference techniques (aka data-plane measurements). 
It is also necessary to mention that the initial traceroute measurement does not 
compromise the user’s anonymity because all of the entities that appear on the 
route between the user and her guard know her IP address once she starts using 
Tor. 
Furthermore, since the user in this case is clearly aware of which ASes appear 
between her and the guard node, she can omit one or more ASes that she 
trusts. In other words, the user can just input a set of ASes that she suspects may 
be able to conduct correlation attacks on her Tor communication, instead of all 
ASes appearing in the traceroute measurement. 
To further protect her anonymity, the user can also divide the set of ASes 
into more than one set and query them using ASmoniTor several 
times. The user can append a compilation of unsafe exit nodes to her torrc file. 
This task can be accomplished because Tor browser allows users to change their 
identity freely (i.e., change the exit node), which prevents ASmoniTor from 
viewing the complete set of ASes and preserves user anonymity. 
For instance, the user in Figure 25 does not trust AS1103 so when she wants to 
access a website that has an IP address of 141.0.174.41, she inputs these two 
parameters. ASmoniTor queries the back-end database and runs anti-Raptor 
algorithm to return a list of exit nodes that should be avoided to prevent AS1103 
from carrying out a correlation attack on her traffic. 
 
Figure 25: An example of ASmoniTor usage 
In more detail, after the user inputs these two parameters, ASmoniTor sends a 
query to the back-end database to search for a table containing all of the AS paths 
between all exit nodes and 141.0.174.41 (warning: this is an IP address of an adult 
website obtained from the top sites in the adult category of Alexa, so please do not 
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try to access it directly from you PC to prevent any claim that may come to you 
from your ISP or your organization). Next, ASmoniTor searches all of the rows 
containing AS1103 and notes the IP addresses of exit nodes in those rows. Once 
the process is finished, ASmoniTor prints the IP addresses of all unsafe exit nodes 
it identified. In this case, the unsafe exit nodes identified were 192.42.116.16 and 
192.121.66.196.1 
 
 
Figure 26: Operating mechanism of ASmoniTor 
5.4 Limitations 
Despite its advantages and improvements mentioned above, ASmoniTor has 
four main drawbacks that should be addressed in future work. 
First, ASmoniTor is still in its trial period and may not be able to handle a large 
number of simultaneous queries. If too many users try to execute our system at 
the same time, it may crash unexpectedly. If the system is rated highly by the Tor 
research community, we will utilize a stronger server and employ SSL (Secure 
Sockets Layer) to serve a larger number of users. 
Second, we initially planned to integrate PathCache into our system so that we 
could always measure the most up-to-date and near real-time AS paths when 
deploying the anti-RAPTOR algorithm. PathCache is an integrated system of both 
data-plane and control-plane measurements, which is superior to previously 
                                                   
1 Note that this result is obtained at the time we fetch the Tor consensus file at 16:30 UCT on 
July 9th 2016. 
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known AS path inference APIs. However, while rolling out the ASmoniTor system, 
the PathCache server went down unexpectedly, which forced us to switch back to 
the old AS path inference technique [57]. 
Third, although ASmoniTor was able to improve the accuracy of AS-path 
measurements between Tor users and guard nodes by utilizing real-time 
traceroute measurements carried out by the user, data-plane measurements still 
need to be used to predict AS paths between exit nodes and the most likely visited 
websites. However, despite its flaws, ASmoniTor is superior to previous proposals, 
which relied solely on data-plane measurements to predict all AS paths. In the 
next chapter, we will introduce a preliminary investigation that shows how AS-
path measurements can be further improved in future work. 
Finally, we only focused on developing an AS monitor system to assist Tor 
users in mitigating the threat of AS-level adversaries. However, due to the nature 
of the Internet (e.g., interconnection, interdependence, etc.), Tor is still 
susceptible to two other higher level adversaries: ISP-level adversaries and state-
level adversaries. In the case of ISP-level adversaries, an ISP may be able to 
deanonymize Tor users by making use of all ASes within its control in order to 
conduct correlation attacks. In the case of state-level adversaries, a government 
can pass laws requiring ISPs to collectively monitor all Internet traffic passing 
through the country’s network backbone to compromise Tor users. Consequently, 
ASmoniTor, in its current state, cannot help users to mitigate correlation attacks 
from such high-level adversaries. However, with future improvements, it may be 
possible to create a safe Tor path in such circumstances. We plan to improve 
ASmoniTor by allowing Tor users to input the name of an IPS (e.g., NTT) or 
country (e.g., Japan) and providing them with a list of unsafe exit nodes whose 
AS paths pass through the specified ISP or nation. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Future Work 
6.1 Conclusion 
We hope that this study will help to raise awareness of some of the issues 
surrounding the maintenance of Internet user privacy and anonymity. In addition, 
although Tor is one of the most popular anonymous communication tools, it 
cannot protect the user’s privacy in all cases. We used a real-world example in 
which Tor is not effective in protecting against AS-level adversaries. 
Therefore, in order to help Tor users to become completely anonymous, we 
extensively studied correlation attacks posed by AS-adversaries, which can be 
used to deanonymize the Tor user. We analyzed works published over the last 
decade to determine why none of these previous proposals were successfully 
taken up by end users. Based on the drawbacks of previous works, we proposed 
ASmoniTor, an autonomous system monitor, to help Tor users mitigate the threat 
of correlation attacks posed by AS-level adversaries. While designing ASmoniTor, 
we were also careful not to cause additional scalability problems in the Tor 
network. 
Although ASmoniTor is still in the early stages of development, we hope that 
we will be able to distribute it widely to end users once the limitations mentioned 
in Section 5.4 are resolved. 
6.2 Future work 
For future expansion of ASmoniTor, we would like to take the following issues 
into account. 
6.2.1 Integrate VPN into ASmoniTor 
As stated in Section 4.3, VPN Gate is a potential solution for the Tor dilemma 
and can also be utilized when Tor users face the threat of ISP-level or state-level 
adversaries. We plan to integrate VPN Gate [72] into ASmoniTor so that the 
program will suggest using public VPN servers when it cannot find many safe exit 
nodes. After initializing the VPN connection, users can revisit ASmoniTor with 
their new identity (i.e., IP address of VPN) to check which exit nodes are safe. 
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6.2.2 Cloudfare and Google Captcha problem 
Due to the increasing number of negative Tor users in recent years, many 
websites have employed Cloudfare or Google Captcha extensively. However, such 
an approach may compromise user privacy and anonymity because it makes the 
visited destination host become two separate hosts (i.e., the intended host and the 
host of Cloudfare or Google Captcha server). Therefore, in future work, we plan 
to test all websites in our database to see which ones are employing Cloudfare and 
Captcha. We will then measure the AS paths between all exit nodes and 
Cloudfare/ Captcha servers. 
6.2.3 A “less-bad” method to measure accurate AS paths 
To the best of our knowledge, the most accurate way to obtain the set of ASes 
appearing between the two ends of Tor anonymous paths is to utilize traceroute-
like tools. Nonetheless, due to the widely distributed and volunteer-based nature 
of the Tor network, it is quite challenging to gain physical access to all guard and 
exit nodes in order to execute traceroute commands. This was a drawback of most 
previous works in which the authors used only a limited number of Tor exit nodes, 
whose owners were willing to participate in their experiments, to carry out the 
traceroute measurements. For example, Murdoch and Zieliński carried out 
traceroute experiments with only Tor nodes based in the UK to sample Tor traffic 
[75]. In a similar manner, Joshua Juen et al. [53] requested Tor exit runners to 
participate in their traceroute experiments, but were only able to obtain 
traceroute results from 28 exit nodes. 
Although we do not have a perfect solution to the current problem of accurately 
measuring AS paths, based on a preliminary test done to count how many public 
servers that provide free traceroute services from their servers across the Internet, 
we expect that we will be able to propose a “less-bad” method of accurately 
obtaining AS paths between the two ends of Tor anonymous circuits. By analyzing 
the Tor consensus document, obtained at 16:30 UCT on July 9th, 2016, we found 
that there are 72 public traceroute servers that host guard nodes and 53 public 
traceroute servers that host exit nodes. These results are much better than any 
prior works mentioned above. 
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Appendix 
Table 12: Top-100 websites (Source: Alexa) 
1 Google.com 26 Ebay.com 51 Xvideos.com 75 Kat.cr 
2 Youtube.com 27 Reddit.com 52 Google.com.mx 76 Blogger.com 
3 Facebook.com 28 Google.co.uk 53 Stackoverflow.com 77 Google.pl 
4 Baidu.com 29 Google.com.br 54 Apple.com 78 Nicovideo.jp 
5 Yahoo.com 30 Mail.ru 55 Aliexpress.com 79 Soso.com 
6 Amazon.com 31 T.co 56 Fc2.com 80 Alibaba.com 
7 Wikipedia.org 32 Pinterest.com 57 Google.co.kr 81 Pixnet.net 
8 Google.co.in 33 Amazon.co.jp 58 Google.ca 82 Go.com 
9 Twitter.com 34 Gmw.cn 59 Github.com 83 Google.com.au 
10 Qq.com 35 Google.fr 60 Imdb.com 84 Amazon.co.uk 
11 Live.com 36 Netflix.com 61 Ok.ru 85 Xinhuanet.com 
12 Taobao.com 37 Tmall.com 62 Google.com.hk 86 Dropbox.com 
13 Bing.com 38 360.cn 63 Pornhub.com 87 Xhamster.com 
14 Google.co.jp 39 Google.it 92 Googleusercontent.com 88 Google.com.tw 
15 Msn.com 40 Microsoft.com 64 Whatsapp.com 89 Outbrain.com 
16 Yahoo.co.jp 41 Onclickads.net 65 Jd.com 90 Cntv.cn 
17 Linkedin.com 42 Google.es 66 Diply.com 91 Cnn.com 
18 Sina.com.cn 43 Paypal.com 67 Amazon.de 93 Booking.com 
19 Instagram.com 44 Sohu.com 68 Google.com.tr 94 Coccoc.com 
20 Weibo.com 45 Wordpress.com 69 Rakuten.co.jp 95 Ask.com 
21 Vk.com 46 Tumblr.com 70 Craigslist.org 96 Youth.cn 
22 Yandex.ru 47 Imgur.com 71 Office.com 97 Bbc.co.uk 
23 Google.de 48 Blogspot.com 72 Amazon.in 98 Popads.net 
24 Google.ru 49 Chinadaily.com.cn 73 Tianya.cn 99 Twitch.tv 
25 Hao123.com 50 Naver.com 74 Google.co.id 100 Microsoftonline.com 
Due to the sensitivity of topic-oriented websites, we do not append them into this 
thesis. For further reference, please visit them using the following URLs. 
Politics http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Top/Society/Politics 
Opinion http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Top/News/Analysis_and_Opinion 
Media http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Top/News/Media_Industry 
Activism http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Top/Society/Activism 
Support 
Group 
http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Top/Society/Support_Groups 
GLBT http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Top/Society/Gay,_Lesbian,_and_Bisexual 
http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Top/Society/Transgendered 
Adult http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Top/Adult 
